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The purposes of this study are to examine the hypothesized costs 
of administration in public and private schools in the light of 
current economic theory of bureaucratic behavior, to determine whether 
there are significant differences in per pupil administrative costs 
between the public and private educational systems and, if there are, 
to determine the sources of those differences. 
I hypothesized that there were significant differences in the 
costs of administering the elementary educational programs in the two 
systems and that these were the result of budget maximizing bureau-
cratic behavior in the public sector. I chose to examine the public 
and parochial school systems of a midsize, midwestern urban community. 
In order to carry out the study, two trips were made to the area 
during which I interviewed the key administrative personnel in each 
system and gathered the necessary data, making sure that I had 
comparable numbers and information for the two systems. 
My primary sources were the annual district and school building 
budgets for the five-year period from 1983-84 through 1987-88. Having 
extracted those costs which were administrative from the total 
budgets, compiled and studied the data, I then returned to the area to 
review and validate the data, share the results with the principal 
administrative personnel and obtain their reactions and comments, most 
of which are incorporated into the study. 
Review of Relevant Literature 
The theory underlying this study is that presented by 
William A. Niskanen, Jr., and others who have examined and attempted 
to analyze the behavior of bureaucratic organizations. A bureau is 
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defined as a nonprofit organization that is financed, at least in 
part, by a periodic appropriation or grant and in which the owners or 
employees do not appropriate any part of the difference between 
revenues and costs as personal income. 1 
Niskanen sees the relationship between a bureau and its govern-
ment review group as that of a bilateral monopoly where the bureau 
"sells" its service only to the government, and the government "buys" 
only from the bureau. 2 The bureau operates in a market which 
involves the exchange of a promised set of activities and the expected 
output of these activities for a budget rather than a per unit price. 
According to Niskanen, this and the bilateral monopoly relationship 
tend to give the bureau the same type of bargaining power as a profit-
seeking monopoly--an all-or-nothing choice. The "sponsor" is faced 
with the lack of a significant alternative and an unwillingness to 
forego the services offered.3 
Niskanen makes the assumption that the bureau acts to 
maximize its budget, and this is the determinant for its preferred 
output level, while government's preferred output is determined by 
conventional majority rule models or by a "high demand" committee; 
i.e., a representative committee whose members have a higher demand 
for the service received than the median demand of the whole 
population group. 4 He hypothesizes that the larger the monopoly 
power of the government and the bureau that supplies the services, the 
larger will be the amount of overspending. 5 He further hypothesizes 
that a strictly nonprofit organization financed entirely by the sale 
of output at a uniform price and operating in the budget-constrained 
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region will supply the optimal level of output and do so at a minimum 
cost per unit of service. 6 
' 
The assumption that the bureau acts to maximize its budget raises 
the question of whether budget maximization by bureaus is consistent 
with utility maximization by bureaucrats; that is, can it be assumed 
that the bureaucrat's utility is, at least in part, a function of the 
size of the bureau's budget? It can be argued that since the 
bureaucrat is not able to appropriate any of the discretionary budget 
to personal income, he/she is not motivated by increasing the size of 
the discretionary budget; i.e., the difference between the maximum 
budget that would be approved by the government review group and the 
minimum cost of producing the output. On the other hand, there seems 
to be some empirical evidence that salary, status, and discretion, 
assumed to be elements of the bureaucrat's utility function, are 
positive functions of the bureau's budget. 7 
Niskanen argues that while the bureaucrat's personal income is 
not dependent on the size of the bureau's budget, the other elements 
of the bureaucrat's utility function such as status, perquisites, 
etc., are and, therefore, there is incentive to maximize the bureau's 
discretionary budget by providing an oversupply of the output and by 
maximizing the desired perquisites. 8 Niskanen goes on to state that 
to the extent there is any effective competition from other sources of 
supply, the demand for output function facing a bureau will be both 
lower and more elastic, and that if government can procure the service 
from another source at a constant unit cost, the demand function 
facing the bureau is horizontal at this unit cost, and the bureau's 
budget is a linear function of output. 9 
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According to Niskanen, the bureaucrat's personal utility is 
derived from the maximization of his/her salary, perquisites, reputa-
tion, power, patronage, the output of the bureau, the degree of ease 
in making changes, and the level of ease in managing the bureau. 10 
The bureaucrat needs to be able to provide increasing budgets for 
his/her subordinates, in turn, to disperse in salaries and contracts. 
Citing "Parkinson's Law" which is based on the popular belief that 
bureaus have an inherent tendency to grow and will grow exponentially 
over time independent of the demand for their output, Niskanen points 
out that this argument is also central to the work done by Anthony 
Downs on the behavior of bureaucracies.11 
Julius Margolis, on the other hand, argues that in defining the 
bureaucrat's utility function, it is necessary to consider lifetime 
aspirations, and that the surest way to advancement may well be the 
minimization of the bureau's budget. 12 He speculates that "doing a 
good job" is more important to advancement than budget growth. 11 13 
Breton and Wintrobe, in their critique of Niskanen's work, take a 
somewhat different position with regard to the behavior of bureau-
cracies. While retaining Niskanen's budget maximizing hypothesis, 
they reject the characterization of bureaucracies as bilateral 
monopolies and assume that since bureaucratic managers are subject to 
the exercise of hierarchical controls by the governing agency, a 
bureau may be a monopoly supplier, but individual bureaucrats are not 
monopolists. Their careers are dependent, at least in part, on the 
sponsor's evaluation of their performance. The "power" of the bureau 
over its sponsor lies in its ability to control information, rather 
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than in being a monopoly supplier. This potential control of informa-
tion on the part of the bureau raises the issue of the ·controls 
needed by the sponsor to efficiently manage the bureau and bureaucrats 
when the necessary information is not "free" and a need to examine 
the costs involved in obtaining the information. Antidistortion or 
control devices are available at a cost; their value lies in the 
reduction of excessive budgeting by the bureau. The sponsor should 
incur control costs up to the point at which the marginal benefit in 
reduced bureau expenditures equals the marginal costs of the 
controls. 14 
In her study, Judith Gruber asserts that the size of bureau-
cracies and their budgets are, to some degree, the result of 
society's efforts to exert controls and the costs resulting from this. 
According to Gruber, there are effectiveness costs and enforcement 
costs involved in constraining bureaucracies and their budgets. 
Effectiveness costs occur when sponsors constrain bureaucrats in ways 
that prevent or undermine their ability to do the job. They result 
from the sponsor's efforts to prescribe and dictate to the bureaucrat 
how to go about achieving desired objectives and to place constraints 
on the bureaucrat as to what "technology" or input mix is to be used. 
Enforcement costs would be those resulting from efforts to ensure 
compliance with prescribed policies and procedures. The two signifi-
cant variables involved in determining the costs of control, whether 
effectiveness or enforcement costs, are the certainty of the tech-
nology and the degree of specialization involved. Certain technology 
implies that we know how to do something and we can confidently 
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estimate how much it will cost to do it. Effectiveness cost will be 
greater in situations with uncertain technologies since it is more 
likely that the controllers may tell the bureaucrat to do the wrong 
things or may,impose constraints that are unduly restrictive. 
Enforcement costs are also more likely to arise in policy areas with 
uncertain technologies since it is more difficult to judge whether 
failure to comply on the part of the bureaucrat is the result of 
willful disregard of the sponsor's intent or results from constraints 
due to inadequacies in the state of knowledge in the field (uncertain 
technology) or constraints arising from inadequate resources. 15 She 
builds her arguments on Anthony Downs' position that technical 
complexity may give a bureau relatively greater freedom from external 
pressure and control and that the harder it is to measure a bureau's 
success, the less likely it is that the bureau will receive clear 
signals about what it ought to do from the agents in its power 
setting. 16 
The potential for effectiveness costs is compounded in policy 
areas where the technology is both uncertain and knowledge concerning 
the technology is highly specialized. In these cases, tight 
constraints placed on bureaucrats might well create excessive effec-
tiveness costs, either by depriving the bureaucrats of the needed 
flexibility to experiment or by dictating the wrong technologies or 
experiments as well as increased enforcement costs if the bureaucrats 
involved attempt to resist or circumvent policies or procedures they 
see as inappropriate or beyond their ability to meet. 17 
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Public School Administration as a Form of Bureaucracy 
When studying the economics of bureaucracies which·provide public 
services, and specifically those of educational administration, one is 
engaged in attempting to measure the production relationships along 
with the resulting cost relationships. One troublesome aspect of this 
endeavor lies in the definition and measurement of the "outputs" that 
are required in order to compare costs to appropriate output levels. 
While difficult to determine, such measurements and comparisons are 
essential to rational decision making. When applied to the area of 
education, this relationship between costs and appropriate output is 
very difficult to measure since the technology is uncertain and there 
is not a clear consensus as to what the desired output should be. 
Education is a service provided in both the public and private 
sectors in the United States. In the public sector it is provided 
through a structure which fits the definition of a bureau, while in 
the private sector it is more typically provided by nonprofit organi-
zations financed by the sale of the output at a per unit price; 
i.e., tuition. Every year during the past decade and more, the United 
States has increased expenditures for public elementary and secondary 
schools. The national average expenditure per pupil has increased 
annually. Between 1970-71 and 1978-79, current expenditures per pupil 
in average daily attendance rose 122 percent which, when adjusted for 
inflation, amounted to an increase of 29 percent. While spending in 
inflation adjusted dollars declined slightly in 1979-80 and 1980-81, 
between 1980-81 and 1981-82 it increased about 1 percent. From 
1981-82 to 1982-83, inflation adjusted expenditures per pupil rose a 
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sharp 4 percent. 18 During this time, when the public resource dollars 
allocated to education have continually increased, there is little 
evidence that would suggest that the "output" has improved either in 
quality or quantity. In fact, criticism and public dissatisfaction 
with the "output" have increased and intensified. We have seen 
significant publications such as Nation at Risk reach the level of 
popular reading and discussion and a plethora of documents at both 
federal and state levels which attempt to evaluate the effectiveness 
of public education. Most recently in Minnesota, the legislative 
auditor's office issued its report, High School Education, to the 
Governor of the state. Sharply critical of public education in 
the state, the report points out that Minnesota is losing--or perhaps 
has lost--its leading edge in education. 
While current criticisms have been aimed primarily at the 
output in terms of qualitative issues, most studies in recent years 
have focused on "inputs" or activities intended to produce the desired 
output, using quantitative data such as enrollment (i.e., number of 
students and/or graduates) as the measure of educational "output" and 
have focused on the average total cost of elementary and secondary 
education at both the district and individual school level. Typi-
cally, the dependent variable has been the per pupil cost, and the 
independent variables have included average teachers' salaries, number 
of credits offered, the average number of courses taught per teacher, · 
the percentage of classrooms built since 1950, operating expenditures, 
and changes in enrollment. For the most part, these studies have 
examined secondary schools and, consequently, have needed to make 
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adjustments for quality differences between schools due to significant 
differences in and diversity of offerings, specialized programs, and 
other qualitative factors. (Elementary schools generally have more 
uniform offerings and, therefore, require less adjustment for quality 
in terms of course offerings.) Most of these studies have dealt with 
issues of overall, total per pupil costs or have focused specifically 
on instructional costs per pupil. 
In 1955, in an address to the American Association of School 
Administrators, Beardsley Ruml made the following statement: 
There are no current comparative cost figures on different 
elements of the public school budget. As a result, there is 
no knowledge of relative efficiency, no incentive to 
experimentation or to investment in cost reducing procedures 
or teaching aides. The department stores of this country 
use comparative figures vigorously to tighten procedures, to 
check waste, to stimulate inventiveness, and indeed, to 
eliminate executive personnel that consistently falls 
behind. There should be similar current reporting for the 
public schools to assure the taxpayers that their taxes ~re 
accepted by school administrators in trust and with an 
informed responsibility for efficient performance on which 
they are willing to give a prompt and regular accounting. 19 
There does not seem to have been any significant change since 
1955, and the above words of Ruml are still, in large part, very true, 
particularly with respect to one of the elements of school budgets, 
that of administration. 
Among some of the less well publicized criticisms of education 
are those directed at educational leadership, which cite the growth of 
massive bureaucracies in the educational environment and support the 
position that better schools require better administration and the 
key to better administration may well be less administration. There 
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is little available research on how much administrative activity is 
needed to maintain a well-managed and efficient school system. The 
question of how many administrators schools need remains largely 
unanswered. The argument is made that the centralization of authority 
and responsibility is rapidly leading to ineffectiveness in public 
education. 20 
The trend of the past 50 years has been toward increased 
centralization. Public education has been transformed from tens of 
thousands of relatively independent "grass roots," citizen-controlled 
districts to centrally controlled, massive bureaucracies. Some argue 
that at least some of the increased costs which are unaccompanied 
by improved educational effectiveness are the result of this 
bureaucratization. 
During the same period of time that this trend toward centraliza-
tion and bureaucratization has taken place in the public educational 
system, the private schools of this country have continued to operate 
as relatively independent, separate institutions, which have at times 
rather fiercely resisted the pressures to centralize and form "school 
districts" as they exist in the public sector. Since this is true, 
the question then arises as to how administrative costs in these 
relatively independent schools compare to those of their more highly 
centralized public school counterparts, and do we have here an example 
of Niskanen's bilateral monopoly and budget maximizing bureaucracy in 
the public sector compared with a nonprofit organization providing an 
optimal level of output at a minimum cost per unit of service in the 
private sector? 
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School Administration Case Study 
In analyzing this question, I selected the public and parochial 
elementary school systems of a midsize, midwestern urban community 
for several reasons. These school systems are seen as fairly similar 
in terms of quality of output; their student bodies are drawn from a 
relatively small and similar geographic and socioeconomic background; 
and there are no significant programmatic differences between them. 
This latter fact is also the reason that I have chosen to look only at 
the elementary level of education in the two systems; programmatic 
differences and complexities become much more pronounced on the 
secondary level and, therefore, cost comparisons become less valid. 
In addition, the public school system tends to be a relatively low-
budget, economically operated system with little apparent bureaucratic 
"fat" or excess. It therefore provides us with a kind of "best case" 
scenario. The study covers the experience of these two systems over a 
five-year period, from July 1, 1983 through June 30, 1988. 
In defining "administrative functions" of the schools, I have 
included the activities of the school board, office of the super-
intendent, finance and business offices, activities related to 
"membership" or attendance, the administration of the instructional 
program, and the on-site administrative functions of the school 
principal since these correspond to the generally accepted categories 
included under administrative costs in school accounting practice. 
In computing the per pupil costs of administration in each of 
these two situations, I used the commonly accepted practice of 
weighting elementary students as equal to one and secondary students 
(grades 7-12) as one and a half. This resulted in the following: 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
12 
TOTAL WEIGHTED ENROLI11ENTS 
Public 
7230.5 
6886.0 
6756.0 
6794.0 
6850.0 
Parochial 
3617 
3586 
3488 
3422 
3263 
Of these weighted totals, elementary enrollments constituted the 
following percentages: 
ELEMENTARY STUDENTS 
AS PERCENT OF TOTAL WEIGHTED ENROLI11ENTS 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
Public Parochial 
---------percent----------
37 
43 
43 
45 
45 
90 
91 
92 
93 
95 
Because the public system is much more centralized and has a more 
highly developed district structure than the private system, the costs 
of the functions performed by the respective districts were analyzed 
separately from the school building administrative functions performed 
on-site in comparable elementary schools within the two systems. 
Consequently, there are two major categories of administrative cost 
comparisons- -those of the Public. School District with those of the 
Education Office of the Catholic Diocese and those of two public 
elementary schools, School A and School B, with those of School C, 
a parochial school in the city. Schools A and B were selected as the 
two sample public elementary schools at the suggestion of the 
superintendent of public schools because they were most comparable to 
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the parochial school in terms of socioeconomic background of students, 
parental involvement in the educational process, and the overall 
educational environment. 
The following is the breakdown of annual total district costs per 
weighted elementary student for the two systems; i.e., the weighted 
percent of total district level administration costs allocated to the 
elementary level divided by the weighted number.of elementary 
students: 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
ANNUAL TOTAL DISTRICT COSTS 
PER WEIGHTED ELEMENTARY STUDENT 
Public Parochial* 
$67.38 $16.57 
83.74 17.35 
102.24 20.89 
107.53 15.51 
114.53 24.14 
* In calculating these costs for the parochial school system, it 
was necessary to make some adjustment for certain functions which are 
included in district costs in the public system but are performed on 
the local level in the parochial system, specifically those that are 
in the category of Direction of Fiscal. Since the responsibilities of 
this area are performed at the local level in each separate school in 
the parochial system, it was necessary to calculate the per elementary 
student cost for fiscal administration using local enrollment figures 
and then add that amount to the district costs per elementary student 
for General Administration and District Administration in order to 
get a per elementary district cost for the private schools that would 
be comparable to the public school costs per elementary student; 
i.e., including the costs of all the same functions and services. 
Over the five-year period of the study, these numbers reflect a 
70 percent increase in public system costs compared to a 46 percent 
increase in private system costs. The on-site, building administra-
tive costs over the same time period are as follows: 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
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ANNUAL BUILDING ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
PER WEIGHTED ELEMENTARY STUDENT 
Public Parochial 
School A School B School C 
$136.02 $165.11 $44.94 
164.87 180.79 72.02 
240.90 196.43 84.61 
241.72 222.63 66.92 
251.77 246.77 94.26 
While the 1.5 weighting for secondary students is commonly used 
in school accounting, it may be that it does not fairly weigh the 
administrative activities required for secondary education. It may be 
that secondary school students place even greater demands on the 
administrative personnel than one and a half times as much as 
elementary school students do. Because the proportion of elementary 
to secondary students is so different between the two systems involved 
in the study, one might raise questions as to what changes would occur 
in the cost per elementary student if a heavier weight were assigned 
to secondary students and what weight would have to be given to the 
secondary students in order to equilibrate the administrative costs 
per elementary student in the two systems; that is, for them be equal. 
To bring the administrative costs per elementary public school student 
to a level equal to those in the private system, it would be necessary 
to give a weight greater than 10 to every secondary student in both 
systems. This is clearly not reasonable, so one is able to conclude 
that while the assigned weights may have some minimal effect on the 
cost comparisons, they do not account for the significant differences 
in costs between the two systems. 
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The obvious question is, what does account for these significant 
per pupil cost differences at both the district and on-site levels? 
One would expect that since the public system is more centralized, 
higher administrative costs would show up at the district level but 
that, conversely, with less centralization and central office support, 
on-site administrative costs would be higher in the parochial system. 
This, however, is not the case. Administrative costs at both the 
district and on-site level are higher in the public system than they 
are in the private system. 
The immediate response to the question of accounting for these 
cost differences tends to be the gross differences in salaries paid to 
the employees of the two systems. In an attempt to deal with this 
variable, I determined the average salary and benefits paid to public 
school employees in the following major administrative areas: 
(1) District Administration (superintendent, assistant superinten-
dents, and secretaries) and (2) School Building Administration 
(principal and secretary). I then multiplied the full-time equivalent 
number of parochial system employees in each category by the corres-
ponding public school average salary and benefit costs and substituted 
these adjusted numbers for the actual salary and benefit costs in the 
parochial system as a way to account for the differences in compensa-
tion between the two systems. The following per pupil cost increases 
were the result: 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
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SALARY ADJUSTED COSTS 
PER WEIGHTED ELEMENTARY STUDENT 
District Administration 
Public Parochial 
$ 67.38 $24.90 (up from $16.57) 
83.74 27.38 (up from 17.35) 
102.24 34.03 (up from 20.89) 
107.53 25.21 (up from 15.51) 
114.53 38.09 (up from 24.14) 
Building Administration Costs 
Public Parochial 
School A School B School C 
$136.02 $165.11 $ 68.02 (up from $44.94) 
164.87 180.79 94.56 (up from 72.02) 
240.90 196.43 114.99 (up from 84.61) 
241.7.2 222.63 113.34 (up from 66.92) 
251. 77 246.77 151.37 (up from 94.26) 
Clearly, while salary and benefit differences do have some 
impact on the cost differentials, adjusting for them does not 
eliminate the differences in administrative costs between the public 
and the private systems. 
The final area which needs to be analyzed is the ratio of 
administrators and administrative staff to students. It is here that 
we find the most significant explanations for the cost differences. 
On average, over this five-year period the administration to student 
ratio in the public school system at the district level was 1:449, 
while during the same period in the parochial school, the ratio was 
1:1154. 
17 
RATIO OF ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL 
TO ELEMENTARY STUDENTS 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
District Level 
Public 
1:472 
1:444 
1:441 
1:440 
1:448 
Parochial 
1:1209 
1:1213 
1:1142 
1:1136 
1:1068 
These ratios were computed by taking the total number of admin-
istrative personnel available in the district in each given year, 
finding the percent of that number which corresponds to the percent 
of weighted elementary students in the district, and then dividing 
the number of elementary students by that number of administrators. 
(Example: In 1983-84 there was a total of 15.4 administration 
personnel in the public school district. The weighted percentage of 
elementary students in the district that year was 37 percent. Thirty-
seven percent of 15.4 gives us the equivalent of 5.7 administrative 
persons allocated to the elementary population. Since there was a 
total of 2,693 elementary students in the district that year, this 
gives us a ratio of 2693:5.7 or 1:472. 
Looking at the on-site building administration, we find a 
somewhat similar picture. The ratios for the five-year period are 
as follows: 
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RATIO OF 
BUILDING ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL TO STUDENTS 
•· ..... , ... 
Public Parochial 
School A School B School C 
1983-84 1:169 1:125 1:354 
1984-85 1:149 1:123 1:248 
1985-86 1:119 1:122 1:230 
1986-87 1:130 1:118 1:271 
1987-88 1:133 1:111 1:228 
Clearly, there are significant differences in the administrative 
costs per elementary student and in the administrator:student ratios. 
This brings us back to the question of how many administrators schools 
need and whether, indeed, the key to more efficient, or at least less 
costly, administration may not well be less administration. Before 
these questions can be answered, we must ask why there are these cost 
and ratio differences between the two systems. 
After spending considerable time with the data and the indi-
viduals involved in the administration of both systems, it seems 
to me that the staffing and cost differences can be accounted for, 
at least in part, by factors other than budget-maximizing bureaucratic 
behavior in the public sector. These factors include both enforcement 
costs (costs of ov~rsight activities and efforts designed to ensure 
compliance with established policies and procedures) and effectiveness 
costs (costs resulting from efforts to prescribe technologies under 
conditions of uncertainty and to measure the "output" or level of 
educational achievement) in the public school system as well as the 
benefits of "volunteerism," community spirit, goodwill, and a certain 
sense of "ownership" in the private school system. 
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There are enforcement costs in both systems since education does 
not involve a "certain technology," and the optimal level of resources· 
necessary to produce a "well educated individual" is not known. How-
ever, my-impression is that these costs are very high and are becoming 
increasingly higher in the public system. The office of the super-
intendent and the office of the fiscal manager spend a large portion 
of their time compiling and submitting reports to the local school 
board and to the state and federal governments. For many programs 
such as Chapter 1, a plan must be submitted; when this is approved, a 
budget must be developed; when this is approved, monthly reports must 
be submitted, as well as a final budget report at the end of the year. 
Without actually having recorded the hours involved, the director of 
fiscal operations estimated that if his office did not have to submit 
all the required reports and forms, they could certainly reduce 
staffing by at least one full-time secretary and probably by one of 
the two more highly paid business officers as well. The public school 
superinten~ent made the observation that during the first seven months 
of a given school year, his office had generated and submitted at 
least 20 major reports to the Department of Public Instruction. 
One suspects that the marginal cost of all these required 
reporting activities far exceeds the marginal benefit gained from the 
resulting information and degree of societal "control." 
In contrast, there is minimal reporting activity in the private 
school system. Because of the highly decentralized structure of the 
system, with almost all major decisions made at the local level, the 
system is able to capitalize on goodwill and a sense of "community" 
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and local control. Much more is left to the discretion of the admin-
istrator, and much less is monitored or "controlled" in a formal 
sense by the sponsoring group. While there is certainly a high level 
of accountability in the parochial system, it tends to be exercised in 
a less structured manner due to the closeness of the community and the 
more homogeneous and cohesive set of educational objectives.21 The 
constraints of the budget and the price per unit of output or tuition 
per student become the tangible, measurable controlling forces. If 
the school fails to produce the desired output at an acceptable price, 
the student can withdraw and "purchase" the desired level of educa-
tional output elsewhere. 
In addition, it seems as if effectiveness costs are also greater 
in the public sector than in the private. While there is certainly 
diversity as to what the desired outcome or "level of output" in 
educational terms should be in both systems, there seems to be more 
agreement and consensus on this issue in the private system. Parents 
have elected to send their children to this school which offers these 
programs, and they buy the existing package for a specific tuition 
price. On the other hand, the public school is "the only game in 
town" for many, all of whom are taxpayers. They have not really 
chosen the package, but they are paying for it. Special interest 
groups, concerned parents, etc., all play a large part in defining the 
"output" in the public system. Several of the key administrative 
personnel who were interviewed spoke of the expectations of the 
clients and what the public school superintendent termed "the response 
demands" placed on the public system. The public system is obliged to 
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meet clients' and constituents' demands. Everyone's particular 
concern becomes a priority to him/her, and the system must respond. 
Clearly, this raises what I have referred to as "effectiveness 
costs," costs resulting from the sponsor's efforts to prescribe 
programs and procedures. While this would be present to some degree 
in the private school system, it would be far from comparable. In 
addition, the private system has the ability to choose and select its 
clients if it so desires; obviously the public system does not have 
this ability. 
Costs of administering programs designed to meet special or 
problem needs will clearly be greater than for administering a some-
what standard program. Although the costs of the "special programs" 
are not directly part of the costs of administration, they certainly 
add the administrative costs involved in budgeting, monitoring, and 
reporting on them. While typically there are not a large number of 
such programs at the elementary level, there are some. It should also 
be acknowledged that for some of these programs, the public school 
administration provides the necessary administrative services to the 
private schools, thus to some degree reducing private school costs and 
adding to administrative costs in the public system. 
There may also be some economies of scale operating in the 
parochial system, where the local school enrollment is on the upper 
end of the. number of students served by a single administrator, while 
the public schools are on the lower end, not by policy choice but 
as the result of demographics and school locations. During the five-
year period of the study, the public system reduced the position of 
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principal at one of the two schools to a half-time position. During 
the coming school year, the other position will also be reduced to 
half-time, with the result that one full-time person will service 
both schools as principal. And it was pointed out that in some of the 
other schools within the public school district, there were consider-
ably more students per administrator than was the case in School A or 
School B. 
Another possible explanation for some of the cost differences 
may lay in the degree of volunteerism involved in the operations of 
the two systems. While this is a somewhat elusive issue and is 
difficult to measure, there does not seem to be any significant part 
of the administration of the private system which does not receive 
monetary compensation, with the exception of the members of the Board 
of Education. While the public school system does compensate the 
members of its Board of Education at a minimal level, in none of the 
five years studied does this compensation exceed $3 per elementary 
student, so this is not a major cost difference between the two 
systems. However, as I visited the parochial school and interviewed 
its administrative personnel, I became increasingly aware of services 
provided for which monetary compensation was not recorded, such as 
working overtime or on weekends without recording the hours, 
consultation and expertise offered gratis when needed, etc. While 
there is no way to calculate an equivalent dollar figure, these 
contributions to the administrative operations of the parochial 
systems cannot be ignored and may well account for at least a part of 
the cost differences between the public and private systems. 
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Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Having taken all of these factors into account,-·one is still 
taken back to the significant differences in administrative costs per 
elementary student.and the very large differences in administrator: 
student ratios. One also has to acknowledge that while private 
school district costs for administration of elementary education rose 
46 percent over the five-year period, those same costs in the public 
system increased by 70 percent. How much of those cost differences 
is the result of controls placed on the public system and the 
consequent enforcement and effectiveness costs, and how much is the 
result of a bilateral monopoly situation in which the bureaucrat 
maximizes personal utility by maximizing the budget of his/her bureau? 
In reviewing the data and the discussions held with key admin-
istrators, I find myself agreeing much more closely with the analysis 
of Margolis and Gruber than to that of Niskanen. The public school 
system is a bureaucracy, and there may well be instances of budget 
maximizing behavior. But on the whole, the public school system and 
its administrators seem to be more subject to the demands of the 
"sponsor" than they are the creators of demand for services. The 
public school administrator is more apt to maximize his personal 
utility through achieving cost reductions, effective programs, and a 
well-managed organization than through the acquisition of perquisites, 
excessive staffing, and inflated budgets. 
It seems as if much of the cost differences between the public 
and the private systems can be attributed to the accountability 
demands placed upon the public system by the legislature, department 
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of public instruction, board of education, etc., and the programmatic 
demands placed upon it by an extremely diverse and heterogeneous 
parent and student population. The results of this limited study seem 
to indicate that it is possible to produce comparable educational 
output and quality at lower administrative cost, and that the causes 
of greater administrative cost in the public sector are a combination 
of (1) bureaucratic behavior; (2) effectiveness costs resulting from 
the society's inability to reach a consensus about and clearly define 
what the desired level of output is and how to achieve it; and 
(3) enforcement costs resulting from society's need to monitor and 
control, excessive concern with reporting, and unwillingness to allow 
a degree of autonomy to.the professional educators. 
Although this study is very limited in scope, it raises some 
significant questions with regard to educational policy and educa-
tional reforms. While the recommendations contained in the Legisla-
tive Auditor's report, High School Education, call for increased state 
regulation, expanded systems of monitoring for compliance, and a 
strong system of state control over local districts, the data 
presented in this study seems to argue in support of less rather than 
more, regulation, bureaucratic control, monitoring, and reporting. 
Proposed programs and policies which are based on the idea that 
better administration may well result from less administration and 
which might well gain support from the results of this study include 
the following: 
(A) School-based management that views the individual school as the 
fundamental decision making unit in the educational system and 
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creates a larger role for teachers and building principals in 
programming, budgeting, and staffing decisions and provides more 
incentive, motivation, and educational leadership to the profes-
sional level closest to the classroom and the student. 
(B) Contracting for services, a system in which the school and/or 
parents could contract with an outside agency to perform specific 
educational tasks with guaranteed results, or in which the local 
school management team could choose to "purchase" educational 
services from the district or from some other alternative 
sources, such as private consultants, institutions of higher 
learning, corporations, etc. 
(C) Voucher plans which would give parents and students the economic 
power to make significant choices with regard to the desired 
educational "output" and would help to create more homogeneous 
educational units, eliminating to some degree the need for each 
school to be all things to all people, attempting to meet the 
entire range of educational demands. (Minnesota's open-
enrollment plan might be viewed as a variation on this concept, 
although it is considerably more restrictive in nature and as a 
result of policy amendments than a voucher program would be.) 
Currently, the Minnesota legislature is being asked to consider 
programs that will tie school funds to educational outcomes. While 
there are some desirable features to this plan, such as a call for a 
clearer definition of what the desired educational "output" should be 
and a demand for greater accountability for dollars spent in terms of 
improved learner outcomes, it seems that a program of this type could 
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well increase the amount of bureaucratic monitoring, reporting, and 
control at the expense of instructional activity and learning, and 
require teachers to be accountable for matters which are beyond their 
control. 
There are many unanswered questions with regard to the economics 
of education and the costs of educational administration and bureau-
cracy. Some areas of further research suggested by this initial 
study would include the following: 
1. A cost-benefit analysis of the reporting activities currently 
required of school administrators by federal, state and local 
agencies. This would involve an analysis and study of the 
actual time spent per administrator on various control activi-
ties, the generation of reports, etc., and a determination of 
what percentage of total administrative work time is dedicated 
to these activities. An equivalent portion of administrative 
salaries plus the associated costs of support staff, computer 
time, etc., would provide an estimate of the dollar costs of 
these activities. What dollar amount can be assigned to the 
time and personnel required to generate these reports, and is the 
benefit derived from the reports equal to this cost? The value 
of these control devices lies in their ability to reduce exces-
sive budgeting by the bureau, and they should be incurred only up 
to the point where the marginal benefit of reduced budget 
expenditures equals the marginal cost of the controls. One might 
also approach this issue from the perspective of the real costs 
of generating these reports; i.e., what would the administrator 
27 
be doing as a professional educator/manager if he/she were not 
reporting, or would it be possible to have fewer administrators/ 
administrative support staff and, therefore, more instructional 
personnel and support staff? 
2. A study of how much administrative time and, therefore, expense 
is actually consumed by each separate and special program. The 
direct costs of administering programs designed to meet special 
or problem needs are usually included in calculating total 
program costs but the indirect costs to the local school or 
district administration resulting from the multiplicity of 
programs are not. In other words, the cost of a program director 
or coordinator would be ~ccounted for, but the added cost of an 
additional program requiring oversight, monitoring, and 
reporting on the part of the school or district administrator 
would not be included in estimates of program costs. Again, an 
analysis of how much time each administrator devotes to managing 
each special program would give a much clearer picture of the 
actual costs of specific programs and would either bear out or 
disprove the contention that the greater variety and diversity of 
educational programs accounts for the greater administrative 
costs in the public system. 
3. A study of how individuals and special interest groups interact 
with the school district and political system to effectively 
demand certain policies and programs and dictate the quantity of 
a specific public good that will be offered. The numerous 
"demand responses" required of the public educational system are 
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the result of some group or groups using political instruments to 
influence public policy in order to acquire a particular type of 
educational program, a public good which they judge to be desir-
able. One might attempt to evaluate the level of discontent 
with present educational policies and programs, the effect of the 
size of groups, homogeneity of preferences within groups, the 
degree of existing organization, and the intensity of demand as 
measures of how much and what types of educational programs are 
provided in the public sector. What is the general public's 
demand for educational services, and how does this compare with 
the effective demand generated by representatives of special 
interests? How is it that the latter seems to have such a 
significant impact on public sector education, while there is 
little of this experienced in the private sector? 
This study has presented some very clear information as to the 
actual dollar costs of school administration and the differences in 
costs between the public and private systems. Clearly, it has raised 
some very challenging questions and has opened the door for further 
research with regard to the reasons for those differences. Hopefully, 
it has also presented some reasonable support for new policy direc-
tions and reconfigurations in the administration of the public school 
system. 
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